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MAKING SENSE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

• JAMES

B. WHITE 0

,vhen a student comes to law school, ht· leaves behind a world
he knows and understands l:l.Nd turns to another world, that of the
law, which at the beginning he cannot comprehend. He is immersed
in a body of literature that is at once assertive and confusing; he
attends a series of classes in which his teacher seems to make the un
settling assumption that he already knows what he came to learn.
One question he will naturally ask himself of all this-his cx
perienu.: of tht• law-is whether it makes any sense tu him. .-\nd
for a long time, if he is honest with himself. he will find that it does
not. Of course others will assure him that if he buckles down and
dol.'s his work, things will come into a sort of order. and this is indeed
,yhut normally l1appcns. For learning tht· law is '\ ldncl of Ieaming
the ropl's; we learn it as we learn to engage in other acth·itics, by
doing it. One comes to know how to do ,,·hat om• could not do before,
and in this sense at ll'ast things can be sai<l to become c:lear.
It mav seem an odcl s01t of daritv. for one cannot wholh· re
produce ii� words what one knows-th� law must be taught as· it is
lcumecl-but it is a trul' clarity 11evcrthcll•ss, based 11pon a true
knowktlge. One knows ,,·hat one is 11p to and how to go ,ibout it.
The cxpedellCl' of making sense by learning to do is one that eYE;t:·
person has, over and over. as he works .his way through life, and
one that en•r,· lawver has as he lcurns to nmkc the argument�-the
countering cl{amc:t�rizations. explanations, .1ppeals. anl justifications
-that make up the stuff of the law. It is an experience knO\\'ll to all
of us.
The question I wish to address in this paper is this: can one
have this l'Xperience of making sense. of watching things come clear,
as one leams to engage in the activity of criminal law? 1 Or is this
• Professor of La\\', The UniH•rsitv of Chica!!o. An earlier version of this
paper was presentetl ,L\ the John H. Coen Le1:turc� at the University of Colorado
School of Law on April 13, 1978. I am \!ratt·ful to the Law School for the
invitation to give that lecture, and for the benefit of the serious and generous
criticism for which that school is remarkable-.
In addition, I wish to thank the followin\! people for their helpful comments
cm earlier drafts of this paper: Clifford J. Calhmm; John Comarolf: Zdenek
Kr\'stufek; Robert Lmlenson; Arthur LeFrnncois; Alfred T. :\lcDonnell: )/orval
:\[orris: Richard A, l'mner: James E. Scarboro: Geoffrey Stone; ancl Franklin
Zimring. I ,un esp<:<:ially 1:,•mteful tn n10ma, Ei..de for his painstaking and
ima,:inative <:riticism of this paper.
1. It is implicit in what I ha,·e said that I will speak in this paper of the
criminal law not as a bod\' of mies nor a., ,Ill or)!anil".ational structure. but as
an ac:ti\'ity: llS that set of social anti intl0lll·<:tuaf prac:tic,·s in which people
eni,.rage as they do the thing.� that make ttp tlw t•riminal prot•,·s.,. from arrest
throuith trial to sentern.:ing and ultimatt• n·leasr•. I look at the crimin.il bw.
l
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set of social and intellectual practices in some fundamental way in
coherent-a so1t of social and intellectual monstrosity of which no
sense can be made, and by which, of necessity, no justice can be done?
This is a question I have heard asked over and over in the classroom
by those who are trying to learn this branch of the law. I have never
heard an adequate response and this paper is my attempt.1
When one asks of an activity such as the law whether it "makes
sense," one asks at least two questions: whether it is internally con
sistent, intelligible in its own terms; and whether it fits in a coherent
way with the other things we do, with the other conceptions we have
of ourselves; that is, whether it has an intelligible and workable re
lationship with the rest of our shared experience. Thus it is that
"making sense" includes the topic of justice as well as that of ration
ality, and the student who says that the criminal law "does not make
sense" means it both ways.3
I will explore the question whether the criminal law can be
said to make sense by comparing two conceptions or versions of the
process, each of which is an attempt to claim an order and a meaning
for it. What I conclude is that on one account the criminal law is
indeed incoherent-in a real sense meaningless-but that when it is
conceived of in a somewhat different way, it can be seen to make a
genuine and importanf kind of sense. I do not wish to put labels on
these two conceptions of the process, or at least not yet, but I do
want to point out that each of them is more than an explanation:
each is an explanation of the law that seeks to become a part of it, a
conception of the process that is offered as a way of giving it shape
that is, from the point of view of the participants engaged in it and ask whether
it can make sense to them, deferring for the moment whether it can be seen
to make sense in some other way, or from some other point of view.
,It is obviously important that the criminal law also make sense to the de
fendant and to the victim, and I hope that the views advanced in this paper
will help make that possible, But this kind of "sense"' is somewhat different
from that with which I am concerned, for these people are not ordinarily called
upon to engage in the activity we call law. They are, as it were, outside of the
process; they provide the material upon which others act in legal ways, rather
than acting in those ways themselves.
2. FOP' fuller statements of what I mean bv law as an activity, see 'vVhite,
Talk to Entering Students ( University of Chicago Law School Occasional
Paper No. 13, 1977); White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking
About People, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165 ( 1974 ).
'vVhat we can mean when we sav that an activitv · of this kind does or does
not ·'make sense" is a central part of my subject, at=id to this extent mv paper
can be taken as something of a case study in the description and criticism of
institutions.
3. These two kinds of "making sense·· are of course intimatelv related.
This is shown, for example, bv the legal historv of slaver-·: the fact that this
institution fit so badly with the other values and practices of our world led
inexorably . to. contradictions that split the structure of the legal system itself,
rendering 1t incoherent internally as well as externallv, For a more extensive
examination of this process, see J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, 430-504
(1973 ).
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and signi.Scance. The question, "does the criminal law make sense?"
invites an answer that organizes and modi.Bes, as well as one that
simply explains, what we do.'
'"
When I say that the criminal law does not "make sense ·when
talked about in a certain way, I do not mean that it is impossible for
a lawyer to learn to.make the arguments for and against a particular
defendant that tire resources of the criminal law permit or invite, for
that can be done and done well. The question is not whether one
can leam the arguments but what, if anything, they all add up to, and
how they fit together. This is a puzzle to every thoughtful lawyer
with a criminal practice, for it goes directly to his own S_£nse of the
meaning of what he does. The judge and juror must face this ques
tion every time they have to d,ecide what they should do in a particular
case. "Shall I convict him or acquit him? If I convict him, of which
of"the crimes with which he is charged? What should his sentence
be? How can I explain to myself or to another why I did what I
did?"
It is to those who ask such questions as these, and those who
argue about them-those at the center of the process-to whom the
criminal law may, I believe, make no sense. The problem is not that
there are no possible answers to the questions; in a sense there are far
too many, cast in different terms and heading in opposite directions.
I.

THE CmMINAL LAW AS A SOCIAL MACHINE:
INCOHERENCE OF PtmPoSE

The usual way to begin a general analys is of the criminal law is
to ask what its "purposes" can be said to be. The assumption of this
question is that the institution of criminal punishment can best be
explained, regulate� and justi.6ed by a proper understanding of the
purposes it is meant to serve. As usually asked, this is not a ques
tion about what might be called the substantive ends the criminal
law should serve, such as security of property or personal liberty, for
those ends can be served in many ways. Instead it is a question about
the methods by which the criminal law, as distinguished from other
legal mechanisms, serves those ends.
It is generally said by those who speak this way that the institu
tion of criminal punishment serves the following lour purposes: (a)
4. There is a special dlfliculty in making sense of the law, for the law is
itself a way both of constituting and of making sense -of experience. What the
judge and lawyer learn Is a special kind of language, a system of meaning that
furnishes its own materials for characterizing expttrience and for explaining
judgments, for carrying on argument and for making justifications. Such a
language IJ. more than a way of talking about the world: It becomes a part of
the world:·· fl: makes possible new perceptions as well as new descriptions of the
world. It offers new capacities for the formation as well as for the expression
of Intention, new materials for motive and aim.
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the deterrence of future misconduct by threat of punishment; ( b) the
incapacitation of offenders by restraint; ( c) their rehabilitation by
treatment; 5 and, though some argue about this, ( d) the satisfaction
of a need_ to exact pain by way of retribution or revenge from someone
who has done a wrong.8
Much contemporary writing about criminal law asks whether, and
how far, each of these purposes serves as a justification either of the
practice of punishment in general or of its infliction in a particular
case or class of cases. 7 The idea is that once the proper purposes
have been agreed upon, they can form a basis upon which the institu
tion of the criminal law can be shaped and action within it guided
or controlled. This is a way of talking about social institutions as
mechanisms that are ( or can be) designed to produce certain material
5. I refer here to efforts guided by the wish to ussist another in the de
velopment of his personality and in the control of his conduct, efforts that
recognize and value the independence of the individual. It would be possible
to call a n.•gime rehabilitative that "\\'as concerned solely to in<luce behavior that
conformed to the rules and expectations of socit:ty, without regard to the mean
ing of such compliance to the individual. What I mean by rehabilitation is
not that, but a kind of education.
6. See. e.g., the proposed Fetleral Criminal Cude, S. 1-1:39, 9.5th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 10I(b)(I978); H. PACKER, THE LI.Mil's OF THE C111M1NAL SANCTION, ch.
3 ( 1968): Unite<l States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. ,H)6 (S.D.;-.;.Y, 1976). The
most useful treatment of the literature nppears in chnpkr one of S. MDISH &
:-.1. PAuui:;:s:, CmMINAL LAW A:-:o !Ts PROCEssEs (3d ed. 1975). R. Cahringer,
P11nislmumt and Responsibility, 6(; J. l'HILOSOPIIY 291. 293 ( 1969), presents an
interestingly mo<lified set of the traditional purposes, distinguishing between
"high" and "low" conceptions of each.
In addition to the traditional four mentionl'd in the kxt, purpo,;es of two
other kincb are sometimes attributed t,, the criminal law, ( a) tho:;e relating to
the protection of the in<lh·idual, ,11ch as giving him fair warning of what is
prohibited am! respecting his established rights and libertit·s ( e.g., :-.rooEL PENAL
CODE § 1.02( l )( c) & (<l) ( Proposed Official Draft 1962)); ( b) purposes based
on the perceptiun that one function uf the criminal law is to establish a com
munity of share<l values ( e.g., E. Di:nK!IEl:<.l, Tm: D1v1s10N OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
108-09 (Si111pson trans. 19:13); R. Cahringer, supra, note 6; J. FEINBERG, DOING
AND OESEl\\'ING 95 ( 1970)).
These kinds of purposes seem to me of a different sort from the traditional
four, and I deal with them differently. The first kind is in fact not a purpose
of crimin,nl punishment at all, but a principle b:,· which punishment is limited.
It is grounded upon values and concerns external to the criminal law proper.
Purposes of the second sort, relating to the creation and maintenance of a
community, are, in my view, of a different sort from the traditional four, for
they imply a view of the criminal law as a system of meaning rather than as a
method of achieving 111aterial objectives. It is, in fact, this general view of the
criminal law that I elaborate and delencl in this paper. See Section III infra.
The best single work on the purposes of the criminal lnw that I know is
H. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw AND CoNTEMP. Pnoes. 401
( 1958).
1. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 35; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
A:-.D RESPONSPI.IILITY ( 1968); J. FEIXBEI\G, supra note 6; A. vo:,; HIRSCH, DOING
JusTrcE (1976). Seo alio Andenaes, The :\lorality of Deterrence, 31 U. Cm. L.
REv. 649 ( 1970); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF !MPI\ISONMEXT, ch. 3 ( 1974);
F. ZIMRJNC & C. HAWJCINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT L'f CRl�IE CONTROL
ch. 2 (1973).
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effects and it is very widespread indeed. It serves as the basis of
most contemPorary talk about social policy, both in and out of gov
ernment, and of our very conception of the bureaucratic state. It is
the mechanical and instrumental language of systems design and
cost-benefit analysis. Of this way of talking it is sometimes said that
it, and it alone, is "rational."
It is this way of talking as it is applied to the criminal law that
constitutes the subject of the first two sections of this paper. I shall
address it in stages, deferring for the moment the question whether it
ever makes sense to talk in this way about an activity such as the
criminal law, and assuming that each of the purposes stated is, stand
ing alone, a valid one. I begin with the question of internal con
sistency: What can it mean to say that the law serves all of these
purposes at once? The purposes are offered, after all, as a statement
of the goals or aims by which the structure of the institution can be
determined and action within it guided, as powerful simplifications
that can organize the thought and action that constitute the criminal
law in operation. But these purposes seem to me to state con
B.icting rather than complementary aims and attitudes; they do not
organize but confuse the activity they are meant to direct. This way
of talking about the criminal law, that is, fails in my view to "make
sense" of it in the most fundamental way, for it is internally incon
sistent.
It would be possible to imagine a system of criminal law di
rected to a "purpose" of the traditional kind that would be, at least in
theory, coheren� and intelligible. Consider, for example, a system
the only object of which was to exact retribution for certain kinds of
wrongs. Argument would, of course, have to go on as to what acts
should qualify as wrongs, as to what punishment each act should
deserve, and so forth. This activity of argument would necessarily
proceed not in terms provided by the criminal law system itself, but
in a language of fact and value found elsewhere in the culh1re.8 And,
of course, in this, as in any system, there would be imperfections in
both conception and execution. But at least one would have an
internally consistent language in which to make arguments as a
8. To punish arson, for example, one needs a set of terms in which to talk
about fire and buildings, a language in which to differentiate burning from other
wrongs and one burning from another. Then, and only then, can the retributive
judgment be made. One might distingwsh, for example, among temples, houses,
and hams; deliberate, careless, and accidental fires; personal, economic, and
political motives; and so on. Such distinctions as these are not created by the
criminal law but exist prior to it; they are rooted directly in the language and
culture of the community and constitute, as it were, the material out of which
the criminal law is made and upon which it acts. For two differing but im
portant views on the relationship between language and culture, see B.L. WHORF,
LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY ( 1956) and A. ADKl:-1S, FROM MERIT TO
I\EsPONsmn.rrY ( 1960).
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lawyer, in which to make and to explain decisions as a judge or juror.
The process might not make sense in another way-for example, it
might be considered intolerably discontinuous with our other ways
of talking about our experience and conduct-but it would be
intelligible in its own terms. In this sense at least one would know
what one was up to--what the object of the enterprise was-and one
could shape one's efforts accordingly.
Internally consistent systems could likewise be based upon the
goals of restraint, rehabilita,tion, and deterrence. In each case, there
would be argument about what conditions or conduct should expose
the individual to corrective sanctions and about what the sanctions
should be. As before, the argument would have to proceed in a
language external to the criminal law itself. But in each case one can
imagine an internally coherent and intelligible system of punishment.
When we try to imagine a system that serves all of these pur
poses at once, however, we seem to turn from what makes at least one
sort of sense to what makes none-from the coherent to the inco
herent, How can one possibly mold an institution, or a set of prac
tices, to serve such deeply conflicting goals as the four usually at
tributed to the criminal law? Consider this case, for example. Imag
ine yourself as the judge charged with sentencing a woman-a wife
and mother-who has killed her husband in a rage; in a rage occa
sioned perhaps by jealousy, perhaps by prior brutality toward her
self or her children, or perhaps just in a rage. Assume, as is often
the case, that there is general agreement that she is unlikely to do
such a thing again, and is thus in need neither of restraint nor of
rehabilitation. Is she to be put on probation, as her own situation
may seem to require, or is she to be punished severely, to her own
injury and that of her children, solely to deter others? How would
you decide such a case? How would you explain your decision to
yourself or to others?
Or, to take a less dramatic case, consider what should be done
with a Brst-offender tax evader. Once the offender has been identified,
future violations are unlikely. Exposure is its own sort of rehabilitation
and retribution, and it makes restraint easy. The offender does not
need a prison sentence. But to put him on probation will impair
the credibility of the threat to others co,ntemplating tax fraud, and
our whole revenue system d epends on truthful and voluntary com
pliance. What is to be done with such a person? How is what is done
to be explained? These are questions that the conception of the
criminal law as a mechanism designed to serve the four stated pur
poses simply does not answer in a coherent or sensible way, or, more
precisely, to which it gives contradictory answers. 9
9. Both of these examples involve a conflict between deterrence and the
other stated purposes of punishment, but other divisions are possible as well.

55

Criminal Law
1978)

MAKING SENSE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

7

It is impo1tant to say that as these questions occur in the real world
they are not, as they may seem to be presented here, hypothetical or
academic, interesting as a puzzle or because of their theoretical im
plications. The question, "what is the right thing to do?" is a real
one. It must be answered by an individual judge about an individual
offender; and he who must answer it has an enormous, sometimes a
terrible, responsibility. This is what I meant when I said above that
it is this person-the one who must make a judgment of this kind-to
whom our law seems to me to speak much less intelligibly, much less
respectably and decently, than it should. 10
For example, if the original conduct in either of the examples were perceived as
deliberate, retribution might be thought to line up with deterrence on the side
of punishment, rather than on the side of lenity.
Conflicts between rehabilitation. and restraint are very common. Frequently
a judge will feel tom between sending an individual to prison and placing him
on probation. The prison sentence makes it unlikely that the defendant will
commit crimes in the short run, but it is also likely to result in a worse ultimate
social and personal adjustment. Probation entails a higher likelihood of real
reform, but also a greater likelihood of repeated crime in the short run.
There are cases, such as those involving an insane or infant defendant.
where one would judge that some coercive action i� required for the protection
of society and the rehabilitation of the individual, but wl1ere neither retribution
nor deterrence would call for sanctions. In our system, such cases are typically
treated as civil not criminal matters. Both the remecly and the procedure reflect
that difference in character.
Some seek to reconcile the inconsistencies of purpose by conceiving of the
different aims as operating in different fashions or at different times. For example,
one could say that unless the defendant has committed ,1 wrong for which retribu
tion could properly be exacted, he is not to be punished at all-retribution LI
used, that is, as a limit on. rc1ther than as a reason for, punishment. Once that
threshold is past, punishment should be shaped not b\' retributive considerations,
but by a kind of compromise among the goals o( deterrence, restraint, and
rehabilitation. This is what I call the modern orthodoxy. Versions of it seem
to be accepted by H.L.A. HART, supra note 7; H. P.-1.cKER, S11pra note 6; :,,/.
:-foRRis, Punishment and Rehabilitation, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Equal Justice
Under Law ( 1976). For a discussion of this view, see text accompanying notes
14-17 infra.
10. The examples given in the text are sentencing judgments, chosen for their
simplicity, but the same problem runs throughout the criminal process. For
example, many of the terms by which the power and duty to determine guilt
are delegated to the trier of fact are by nature-and on purpose-uncertain in
meaning. One thinks of "malice" in murder law, for example, or ''breach of the
peace" as an offense. These terms are to be given content only bv reference to
the aims and nature of the activity of criminal punishment. When these are
stated as "purposes" of the sort listed in the text, the same contradictions exist
at the trial stage as at sentencing. For an analysis of this problem in some detail.
see J. White, THE LEGAL IM.-1.GINAnoN 317-63, especially at 358-60 ( 1973), In
part III, infra, I suggest another way of_ talking about the practice of punish
ment, which I believe permits the trier of fact to resolve such uncertainties in an
intelligible and coherent way, as in my view he cannot do under the "purposes"
theory.
The legislature can try to remove the incoherence from the law by making
all judgm ents itself--defining crimes more precisely and settin� fixed sentences.
But that merely means that the incoherences go underground, hiding either behind
the legislative judgment or buried ln silent discretionary acts by judge or juror.
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II. THE CruM!NAL LAW

AS A RHETORICAL SYSTEM

The conception of the criminal law as a mechanism directelby the
four traditional purposes is incoherent because these purposes con
stitute a contradictory set of directions to those people within the
institution-judge, juror, and lawyer-who must make the decisions
or frame the arguments to be guided by them. Conceived of in this
way, the institution forces a choice among its competing purposes but
affords no method by which that choice can be made and explained.
This suggests our next question: is it possible to find or devise such
a method-a language in which to think and 'talk about these choices,
a body of law to govern them?
I will approach that question by suggesting that we regard the
law not as a social machine directed to the achievement of certain
goals ( which in this case are impossibly inconsistent) but as what
might be called a rhetorical or argumentative system. The criminal
law, that is, can be· seen as a set of materials and procedures for
speech and thought; the tension or incompatibility among its stated
purposes is its central subject. Put another way, what is from one
point of ·view a contradiction, among the purposes of the criminal
law can be conceived of as a statement of the problem that this
branch of the law is meant to be a way of addressing. It can be
converted, that is, from an anomaly into a topic.
A. The Law ll8 a Rhetorical System
Let me begin with an example. The fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution forbids "unreasonable searches and sei
zures." That language invites the Court ( or other agency interpreting
the Constitution) to "strike a balance," as we say, "between com
peting interests." The job of the law is to make a regulated com
promise between the interests of thp individual and those of the gov
ernment, for it is obvious that neither class of interest may prevail
every time. Such' a compromise comes about only through argument
and explanation; and ih our system it is the rich and complicated dis
course elaborated under the heading of the fourth amendment that
defines and manages the problem created by this clash of competing
interests. 11 Another way to put this point is to say that a language
11. For an elaboration of this point, see

J.

\Vhjte, The FotJrth Amendment

as a Way of Talking About People, 1974 Sup, CT. REV. 165.

A similar process of definition and management underlies those legislative
and judicial judgments that detennine the scope of the substantive criminal law;
when, for example, a state legislature decides not to punish gambling or prostitu
tion or marijuana possession but does prohibit bookmaking, public solicitation of
sexual acts for pay, or the �ale of marijuana; or when the Supreme Court holds
that under. our Constitution no state ma:' punish abortion within the first tri
mester, or blasphemy, or criticism of the President, but ,that abortion in the last
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of individual rights of this kind requires for its very existence that
there be organized state action on one side and individual liberties
on the other. A Bill of Rights running against the State of Mars, for
example, or against the �Ien of the Middle Kingdom, would be mean
ingless and empty. The clash between individual and state interests
is not incoherent or contradictory but essential to the definition of the
issue, case, or question with which the law is to deal. For it is in
the nature of law that it address a problem defined by an opposition,
that it respond to a sense that things are at odds.
The law can be seen, then, not as a kind of social machine, but
as an organized way of talking and acting about certain kinds ot
problems, as a special language with both subjects and procedures of
its own. It is a rhetorical rather than a bureaucratic or instrumental
system: in it statements of value function not as statements of the
"purposes" or "goals" that the system is meant to achieve, but as
definitions of the topics of the special kinds of argument and thought
that constitute the system in operation.
On this view, the function of the law is to create a set of places
and methods for speech and thought; to establish procedures, in
cluding voices and roles, which both make possible and regulate its
special kind of talk; and to create a languuge of fact and value, of
social category and aim. in which that talk can proceed. It is a
way of stmcturing argument and, in doing so, of furnishing materials
for judgment. It is a way of addressing problems. but it is more
than that, for it creates the problems it addresses.
�Iy question is this: can the inconsistency of purpose we have
identified in the criminal law be regarded not as an impossible seU
contradiction in the mechanism of the law, but as a statemet1t of the
problem which the rheto1ical system of the criminal law is meant to
be an organized and intelligible way of addressing? This is another
version of a suggestion I left with you earlier, when I said that the
conflicts among the various purposes of the criminal law could not be
resolved in terms of any of them standing alone, but could be resolved,
if at all, only if, they were made the subject of another language,
another body of law, b�· which choices among them could be made
and explained. Is there, or can there be, such a language, such a
body of law?

B.

Can the bicoherence of Purpose Be Restated as the Topic of an
Intelligible Rhetorical System?

To test this possibility, let me ask you once more to pretend that
you are a judge. Consider again the examples I put to you earlier,
trimester, by contrast, may be punished, as can obscenity or threatening to kill
the President.
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those of the first-time tax evader and the wife who killed qer husband.
Assume that you, as a sentencing judge, have decided that if you
considered only the need for rehabilitation and restraint, and the
reprehensibility of the conduct when judged in light'of all matters of
circumstance and motive, you would put the defendant on proba6on.
But you are also told by the law that it may be your duty to sentence
the defendant to a substantial term in order to deter others from
committing other crimes in the future. Can you conceive of a respect
able process by which such a choice as this can he made?
Notice that I am not asking whether either of the two methods
of sentencing, standing alone, could be conceived of as intelligible or
proper. For present purposes we can concede that both could be.
My question is whether the choice between them can be made in a
respectable way.
My answer is that it cannot. The tension between deterrence
and rehabilitation cannot, in my view, be converted into a topic of an
intelligible discourse, as, for example, crime control \'ersus due process
or restraint versus liberty can be. Unlike these topics, which pem1it
a sort of jostling compromise, this opposition is complete; one choice
by its nature excludes the other. A traditional way of defining the
quality of this opposition is to say that the choice is between treating
the offender as a person and treating him as an object. This seems
intuitively to be a polarity that cannot generate an intelligible dis
course of harmonization and compromise, any more than the pairs
"just" and "unjust," "good" and ''bad," or "friend" and '·enemy" can do.
Another way to put the same point, to me more suggestively; is to say
that the opposition is at heart a conflict between fundamental con
ceptions of character-the character of the court, of the defendant.
and of the relationship between them-and that consistency is essential
to any conception of character.
What I mean is this. Essential to the creation of a working
rhetorical and social universe, which I regard as a necessary aim of
law, is the creation of a set of intelligible voices and comprehensible
positions-authorized ways of talking, if you will-with respect to
which the individual. whether official or private citizen, can locate
himself in an intelligible way. For example, it is one function of the
law of the fourth and fifth amendments to define an impo1tant part
of what it means in our world to be a police officer and what it
means to be the citizen with whom he interferes. This body of law
is meant to constitute a coherent set of ways of defining each party,
telling each, in some respects, what he must, and in others what he
may, do and say: giving each, in .the context of their relationship, a
way of conceiving of himself, of the other, and of the world in which
they both act. 1:? Similarly, it is one function of the law, especially
12. This view is expanded in White, supra note 11.
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of the criminal law, .to create and make real the conceptions and
roles of the judge, of the lawyer, of the juror, and of the criminal
defendant; and it does this by giving each role a character of its own.
The law is a literature of meaning, and one way in which its mean
ing is established is .through the definition and maintenance of char
acter.
The conflict between rehabilitation and deterrence, however, is a
COnfilct between different conceptions of the characters of the judge,
of the defendant, and of the law itself; that is whv it so unresolvable,
for consistency is essential to any claim of chara�ter. On matters of
this kind, that is, one simply cannot get away with the sort of vacil
lating we-have assumed that judges are supposed to do-treating some
one now as a person, now as a thing, now as a friend, now as an
enemy. If one claims and performs two contradictory characters in
alternation, what one has is neither of those, but the character either
of a chameleon-an alternating contradiction-or that of a hypo
crite. If I hear a judge say, with-deep sincerit:·· ":\ly concern is with
the welfare of those who come before me," I will believe him only if
that voice, and conduct consistent with it, are regularly maintained; if
in every third or fourth case he makes plain that the person before
him is to be considered as an enemv or as a resource, I know how to
read what he earlier said. I know ·what clmracte't he has given himself, and it is not that of a friend or of an honest man. 1 :s
To sum up: the incoherence of purpose in the criminal law does
not disappear when one reconceives the law no longer as a social
system designed by reference to its purposes, but as a rhetoiical system,
of which the inconsistencies of purpose are reg,lrded as the topic or
subject. The reason the incoherence remains is that consistency of
character is essential to the coherence of a rhetorical svstem ( for a
rhetorical system is, among other things, a social system); and the
opposition with which we are concerned entails deeply contradictory
conceptions of the character of the judge, of the defendant, and of the
relations between them. The judge cannot maintain an honest and
consistent character while treating one defendant as• a person whose
needs and circumstances are paramount and another as an invol
untary participant in a deterrence program.
0

C.

Reconsideration in Light of the Orthodox Position

Or is all this too strong? Is it conceivable that the judge might
explain his shift from one role to another, thus giving himself a new
13. Some shifts of role and attitude can of course be sa tisfactorlly explained,
and if this were true here the judge would have a third character: that of the
perso� wh� shifted in a comprehen sible way between the two roles or voices we
_
have identified. For the reasons given in the next section, I do not believe that
any such explanation is possible.
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character which incorporates both possibilities, for which a claim of
consistency could be made? The most widely accepted view of the
criminal law assumes that this can be done; but I believe that it is
impossible, .and that even to attempt it the judge must take upon
himself a character that is inconsistent with our most fundamental con
ceptions of what a judge is, what the law is, and what it means to be
a ,citizen in our world.
The orthodox view might be put this way by a judge speaking
to a group of convicted defendants whom he is about to sentence:
"What we shall do," says he, "is to treat you all as cases for restraint
and rehabilitation, unless we are persuaded that the public interest
would be served in the individual case by a punishment designed to
deter, in which case we shall inflict it. While it is not an easy task to
identify,those cases in which the public interest requires a deterrent
sanction, it is a familiar one; the usual methods we have of identifying
and measuring costs and benefits, of e�timating risks and determining
preferences, will serve us here as they have elsewhere.
"It may at first se� that this power of discretionary punishment
in the public interest is inconsistent with the nonnal premises of the
rule of law, but in fact it is not. Our power rests firmly upon the rule
of law in the sense that it is established and limited,by the legislature,
which determines the maximum penalty with which any offense can
be visited. It is consistent with the rule of law in the larger sense as
well, for it is perfectly fair: it is only those who, like you, have .
violated the law and have thus forfeited the. right to consideration of
their interests (except as they coincide with those of the public) who
will be subject to this treatment. You can even be said to have
inflicted this exposure on yoursel;_,es, for no one in our system is
convicted of crime mJless (a) he has adequate notice of a sufficiently
clear prohibition to be able to avoid violating it; and ( b) is himself
at fault with respect to the prohibited conduct.
"Fault means at least two things: ( l) that the offender have what
ever guilty minc.l the particular criminal statute requires for liability
intent to kill, recklessness with respect to life, intent to defraud, and
so on; and (2) that he is a competent person, able to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. It is upon a voluntary and
wrongful act that the forfeiture of which I speak is conditioned ancl
its fairness rests."
This is not an imaginary explanation or justification, but the best
statement I can make of what I would call the contemproary ortho
doxy.14 vVhat can be•said in response?
lj. This view of the criminal law connects what might at first seem two
inconsistent strains in the '.\lodel Penal Code ( and of the other codes reflecting
the modern tradition): the use of the punishment of the defendant iri more or
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I begin with three observations. First, even if the system de
scribed in the imaginary judge's statement were to be regarded as
intelligible and fair, it is not the system we follow in fact. Under our
law it is often possible to incur serious c1iminal liability without fault
of any kind; and it is by no means accurate to say that one is entitled
to an acquittal if one can show that one was not capable of con
fonning one's conduct to the requirements of the law. 15 That is, the
view I call the modem orthodoxy is a theory of what the law should
be, no� a statement of what it is in practice.
Second, even if we were to try wholeheartedly to follow such a
system, I do not think we could do so. It requires judgments that in
practice we cannot make, or at least not with the degree of confidence
required by the theory itself. For example. when this theory is
boiled down, it amounts to a statement that it is fair to use the class
of persons convicted of crime for deterrent purposes because we
told them that we would do it this way if they dolated the law and
they went ah,ead and voluntarily violated the law anyway. Justification
of punishment depends entirely upon the judgment that conduct is
''voluntary"-othenvise no "forfeiture" can fairly he imposed. But it
has never been made clear what "voluntarv" can mean. As we all
know, the rudimentary image of human fre�dom to choose is far too
simple to be an adequate account of deviant and criminal behavior.
None of us is wholly free, and in some sense those among us who
commit crimes, at least crimes of certain kinds. are less likely to be
free than the rest of us. What is the condition of freedom which this
theory assumes, and how shall it be proved or disproved in p.uticular
cases? This question, upon which the fairness of punishment under
the orthodox theory depends, is never adequately answered.
Third, it is not clear what the function of the word "forfeiture" is.
It is plain that in these cases we do not have a conscious _waiver or
less utilitarian ways to achieve the objectives ( or purposes), of the Code and
the insistence upon fault as the necessary condition to criminal responsibility.
This is also the view of H.L ..-\. Hart, who speaks of retribution as a limit upon,
rather than a reason for, criminal punishment and who believes that the true
principle goveming criminal responsibility is that it is unfair to punish one who
cannot help doing what he does. H. H.1.nT, Pu�ISH�IE:--T .1..:-;D REsPONsIBILITY,
ch. 2 ( 1968).
15. The leading criminal case on strict liability is t'nited States v. Dotter•
weich. 320 U.S. 2i7 (19-13). See also United States \'., Park, 421 U.S. 658
( 197.5). The typical insanity statute limits the defense to certain incapacities
arisin_l( from mental disease or defect; it may even conflne the defense to cases
in which the defendant cannot appreciate (he wrongfulnes- of his conduct, omit
ting. any reference to his capacity to control his conduct. In any event, the
language of the insanity defense is extremelv artificial: and its artificialities can
not be eliminated by an attempt to guide the judgment of )-'ttilt by reference to
the.. purposes for which the insanity defense exists, at least if these are ,tated in
ways that entail and reflect the "purposes" of the criminal l.1\\· itself. for these are,
as we have seen, contradictory. Whether the purposes of the insanity defense
l'llll be stated in other terms is considered in part Ill, iufra.
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willing relinquishment. What we do have is a class qf offenders,
situated equally with respect to fault and circumstance, who are
treated in radically different ways, the difference being based upon
the relative usefulness to society of one kind of sanction or the other
in the particular case. It is conduct that justifies punishment, to be
sure, but that is not to say what kind of punishment-torture?-is
justified, nor what inconsistencies of treatment are permissible. The
forfeihlre argument, it seems to me, will not do, for it assumes what
is at issue, namely that upon conviction ( and within certain limits)
one is exposed to whatever sanction seems to be tnost useful to the
public. It is by contrast my view, elaborated below, that judgm ents
of guilt, grading, and sanction should all be made solely by reference
to the blameworthiness of the conduct in question. ( The real function
of the forfeiture argument is, I believe, not to justify a punishment but
to reassure an audience. It tells us, the socially competent, that we
need not fear that the power of discretionary punishment will be
used against us.) The practice of punishment as justified by the
forfeiture theory may in fact be seen as a sort of cruel joke. Under it
many people are punished who have indeed done harmful actions,
but whom it is hard to call free in the sense required by the theory
itself; and the beneficiaries of the practice are those who-like us
are for the most part much more nearly free to choose, as is demon
strated in part by our managing not to commit the forbidden acts.
We punish those who are not free in order to control the conduct
of those who are.
Having made these three preliminary observations, I come
now to my main point: the orthodox view does nothing to solve the
problem of character with which I began. Each of -the four pur
poses of the criminal law imp1ies its own conception of the char
acter of the individual and of the judge. If one acts with a
genuine solicitude for the offender's welfare, and seeks-however
misguidedly in practice-to rehabilitate him, one can properly be
said to respect his humanity. One treats him as a p erson in a
different sense when one acts to restrain him-for one does to him
no more than he should recognize that it is necessary to do to him
and to others who threaten the security �f the community. In still a
different sense, to be elaborated in the last section of this paper, one
treats an offender as a person when one punishes him as an act of
that special fonn of retribution I call blaming.16 But when one
imposes a punishment not required by any of the particular character16. Rebibutive punishment can take other forms as well. It can express the
simple desire to annihilate another or the pleasure of inflicting pain. These
do not recognize the personality of the offender as I suggest below that blaming
does. For a defcn.se of one kind of retribution, see C. S. Lewis, The Humani
tarian Theory of Punishment, reprinted. in Goo IN nm Docx 287 ( 1970).
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istics of the defendant's personality or the circumstances of his life or
the nature of his conduct, merely to make him serve as an example
to others, what one has done is to convert him from a person into
a resource pr object to be employed in the public interest. One has,
as it were, drafted him into a population control program.H
It does not harmonize these inconsistent relations to say that the
court bas the character of none of these but that of the agency that
chooses which character it should have at any one time. What that
does is to reduce all the characters to one, that of the agency with
despotic, if limited, control over the offender, who will use him as it
seems to suit the agency's view of the public interest. This makes
wholly false the ethical claims upon which the power to rehabilitate
and restrain rest, namely that the law respects the offender's humanity.
Under the orthodox justification, then, there is either an impossible
alternation of roles or the single ro�e of the judge who disposes of the
offender in the public interest but sometimes speaks in other voices.
Either is inconsistent with our conception of what it means to be a
citizen or a judge in our world, indeed with our .conceptions of law,
of justice, and of honesty.
It may make my point clearer if you think of punishment in the
family. In any family punishment is, I suppose, inflicted, usually
resting on one of two grounds: the need of the child to be corrected
for his own sake; or the need of the community, and the child, that
he be incapacitated from certain kinds of destructive acts. It would
be a wholly different kind of activity for a parent to punish one child,
not for the sake of that child, but for the benefit of his younger
brothers and sisters. (This would happen, for example, if the parent
judged that the child had already learned his lesson.) I suppose that
this sort of punishment would not be regarded as desirable by most
of us, but my present concern is less with its relati\·e desirability than
with the nature and effect of an alternation between the two modes
of punishment. If one punished a child so�}etimes for his own good
or on account of his own propensities, sometimes as an example to
others, the result would not be that one sometimes had the character
of the parent who respected the humanity of each of his children,
sometimes not, for that is simply impossible. One would be either
a chameleon or a hypocrite. It is just such an impossible shift in
17. One way the defendant might want to respond to a judge who speaks
to him in the wav that the orthodox view would suggest is to ask, .. Who on
earth do you think: you are, to talk to me in such a way?" I think that any
respectable conception of the criminal law should include or suggest an answer
to that question. To say "I am one who uses vou as I believe { or as the
legislature believes) the public interest requires,"' fails in my view to meet any
standard of acceptability.
In Utility, Publicity, and· Manipulation, 88 ETmcs 139 ( 1978), .\drian Piper
maintains that the conceptions of chamcter and relationships implicit in utilitarian
theory are defective and impoverished.
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role and character that the criminal law, as we have conceived it,
requires the judge to try to make.
What all this means is that the incoherence of purpose in the
�riminal law does not, after all, disappear when the criminal law
is analyzed as a rhetorical system, the central topic of which is the
conflict among its stated purposes. For the contradictions in the
criminal law are not merely competing statements of value, nor a way
of defining the problem that it is the point of the institution to ad
dress. Rather, they give a contradictory character both. to the in
stitution itself and to those ·.vho must act within it, for thev define
impossibly incompatible ways of proceeding. They order th·e judge.
as it were, to be, to do, and to feel inconsistent things at the same time.
Is there another method of description and analysis, or a modi
fication of one of these, which would enable us to conceive of the
practice of punishment as intelligible and coherent? Is there some
way, that is, in which we can make sense of this activity after all?

III.
A.

MAKINC SENSE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:

THE

PRACTICE OF BLA."\IlNG

The Lau_; as a Language of Meaning

In the first part of this paper I tried to show why it is impossible
to make sense of the criminal la\\_' if one speaks of it in the usual wa:,:,
as a social machine to be shaped and justified by its four trnditional
purposes. The reason I gave is that those purposes are mutually
contradictory arrd provide contradictory directions to those who must
engage in the activity of criminal law. vVhat is more, this version
of the criminal law suggests no method by which the contradictions
or conflicts might be addressed. So regarded, the criminal law is
indeed, as I said it sometimes seems to one"s students, incoherent.
What I would like to suggest in the present section is that-the internal
contradiction identified above is not the only defect in the way of
talking about the criminal faw as a purposive mechanism, for it does
not, in my view, make sense to speak of an activity like the criminal
law as having "purposes'' of such an abstract and simplistic kind at all.
I wish then to explain how I think the criminal law-and the law
generally-can more sensibly be conceived of and talked about,
expanding upon the conception of the law as a rhetorical system that I
outlined above. My hope is to show how one can, after all, make
sense of the criminal law.
I begin with the question whether it is ever sensible to speak of
an activity like the criminal law as n purposive nwchanism. The as
sumption of such a way of talking seems to be that one can reproduce
in a schematic languagl', as if one wanted a blueprint, both ,m account
of the mechanism of the law ( or other social institution) and a state-
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ment of the goals or objects by which it is to be directed. Argument is
invited on the questions whether the goals are proper ( and properly
stated) and how to design the machine to achieve them. Once these
matters are settled, the only question is an empirical one, whether
the design "works" in practice.
In my view, this way of talking about the criminal law mis
represents the nature of human action and experience, and mis
conceives the nature of language. It is as false to the nature and
meaning of criminal law as it is to the other activities-for example,
those of the classroom-to which it is frequently applied. Of course
it is true that the practice of punishment, like the practice of teach
ing, is intentional or purposive. One naturally wants to be able to
say that one knows what one is up to and how to go about it. The
question is not that, but how we should choose to talk about our
intentions, in what language we should define our motives and claim
meaning for our actions. I think that the reduced langui1ge of the
purposive machine is not adequate to our needs. for that metaphor
does not permit us to say what we know about what we do. I think
that this way of talking, which may seem at first to be so "rational."
in fact prevents us from making sense of our experience.
Consider the nature of the practice we call punishment, for
example. It has been with us much longer than any self-conscious talk
about institution-building or the de�gn of social systems. It is a
practice in which every country, I daresay e\·ery commtmit:, in the
world, engages. Indeed, it may be necessary to the very idea of a
community, for its subject is approval and disapproval, acceptance
and rejection, inclusion and exclusion. It is something we do; and
something we seem, for the most part, to know how to do. Punish
ment, in short, is an activity like many others-family life, \\'arfare,
education, making beautiful objects and sounds. arguing, and be
lieving-which is not wholly subject to theoretical comprehension or
restatement. 18 It. is only partly guided and controlled by the logical
faculty in rational pursuit of stateable objectives. It is guided by
feelings as well: of anger, of revulsion, of sympathy, of appropriate
ness, just as other such activities-teaching, raising children, tending
gardens, and the like-are guided by feelings. Punishment is guided.
in fact, just as forgiveness is guided.
Activities of this sort engage much more of the mind than its
quantitative or mechanical capacities, and they cannot be represented
or regulated in a language of mechanism. They are based not upon
18 . .-\s a comparison, think of the activity of teaching, how rich and difficult
it is. and how wnolly inadequate to it is the simple language of "transmitting
information" or "developing testable skills" used by the professional educator.
One can imagine similar schematic simplicities applied with equally impossible
results to the life of the family, to arguing jury cases, and so on.
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processes of calculation but upon a sort of educated self-evidence,
a sense of what is natural or appropriate, which is at once the simplest
ground .of action and the most complex, for it is the point at which
intellect and instinct, mind and nature, meet.
I do not mean that such activities cannot be learned, shaped, and
modified, or that they cannot be the object of critical contemplation
and understanding, for of course they can; I mean only that the
language of the purposive mechanism is too simple and too mechanical
to serve as a language of description or criticism of them. That
language does not respect the limits we ordinarily acknowledge upon
our capacities to explain and justify what we do. Only a wholly mad
judge, for example, would think that any of his decisions could be
wholly explained, wholly rationalized, or wholly justified. He does
-the best he can to decide the right way, and to say what is possible
by way of explanation, but he knows that he cannot say everything.
He cannot justify, or even reproduce for criticism, ''every stage of the
process." Explanation, in the real world, is always incomplete. Sup
pose, for example, that someone asked you why you moved to
Colorado, or why you decided to come to law school. Both your
questioner and you would know that something could be said by
way of response, perhaps something illuminating, but neither would
expect you to produce some equivalent of·a computer tape, showing
with precision and completenes� every operation of your mind, nor
to state with accuracy a list of the relevant "purposes" you were pursu
ing. Meaningful talk about difficult matters is itself difficult and
partakes of the uncertainty of the experience that is its 'subject. 19
19. If the language of a purposive mechanism is as simplistic and wrong
headed as I suggest, one can naturally ask how it arose. It seems to me to
work this way. What are claimecl to be the "purposes" of the criminal law
are, I think, not really its purposes at all, but a reduced catalogue of the
effects that punishment has been seen to have in practice. These effects come
to be regardecl as purposes on the following assumption: that our social world
is a machine or artifact, in which all action can be perceived and classified in
a language of cause and effect, Ln which every activity can be rationalized by
the q11antif}ing mind. It is a precUsposition to assume that the only rational
way to talk about social institutions is through the metaphor of the machine that
converts effects into "purposes" ancl leads to the problematic contradictions I
have identified. That predisposition, ( which seems to deri\·e in the modern
world from Hobbes's Leviathan), of course enjoys enormous academic popularity,
especially in what are called social or policy sciences.
Another way to put this point is to say that what I have called the language
of systems-design elevates one part of the mind over all others, for It assumes
that one kind of intellectual activity is the only kind. Its appeal is to the part
of the mind that proceeds abstractly and theoretically, that prefers reasoning by
definition, distinction, and clednction to what appear to he messier, but which
are more comprehensive, ways of thinking; to the part that seeks to expand its
claims to understanding and to control by reductive simplil!cations of e:ocperience
rather than by speaking and thinking in ways more nearly true to what we
know of what we do.
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But if the language of mechanism and purpose is inappropriate to
these matturs, l1ow can we talk about them more satisfactorily? How
can wt• lcam what is to be learned and say what is to be said here?
To beJ,tin with the point I made before, punishment seems to be a
universal social practice, essential to the existence and life of a com
munity. Hut communal punishment is a practice of a special kind,
for its function is to claim a certain kind of meaning for events. In
this it partakes of the nature of law, which, as I have suggested
above, is,. in my view, best regarded not as a machine for social con
trol, but a.'I what I call a rhetorical system: a set of resources for
claiming. resisting, and declaring significance. It is a way of asking
and responding to questions; of defining pasitions from which, and
voices with which, to speak; of justifying and explaining action and
inaction. It is one of the forms in which a culture lives and changes,
drawing connections in special ways between past and present, near
and far. The law, of which legal punishment is a part, is a system
of mea11i11g: it i.'I a language and should be evall!ated as such.20
What l mean by ·a system of meaning can perhaps be made
clear with an example. One person injures another, and an argument
begins lit'tw<·cn tl1cm. This argument is in large part over what that
event shall he held to mean in the world they both inhabit. This
argument l'l\11 proceed on the street-comer, in the living room, in a
private lawsuit, or in the criminal courtroom. In each case the actors
use and 111ai11tain a language of meaning, appropriate to the context,
by which their c.-laims are advanced and countered. ·where the
argument is legal (whether civil or criminal), the maintenance and
use of th<· h111guage of meaning is an official activity. The law gives
a public nwaning not only to the conduct and experience of the parties,
but to tlw action of the court, which is itself a kind of declaration.
My l'lai111 that thl' activity of the criminal law is comprehensible only when
it is rl'�.1rd,-.I :ts .what I call a practice, i.e., an organized activity .not reducible
to the sin�!,• faculty ,,f ratiocination, is part of a larger point I wish to make,
that the law is prnp,•rh· regarded as an art, not a science. This is of course not
to say that s<'i,·nc-e--or social science-has no place in the world. Both natural
and social s1·i1•11crs h,wc much to report about the nature of the world in which
we live tha t mav ht• ,,f interest to legislator, judge, lawyer, and juror. The study
of institul ion� in tt•rnL� of their causes and effects can do doubt be valuable.
But tht• .1<"tivit\' of bw is not a scientific activity, nor rei:lucible or convertible
Int� _sud, au ;lt'tivity. any more than activities of history or of argument or of
_
pohtrcs nr ,,1 nnvel-writing are scientific activities. Any account of law whi<?h
1s to n1ak,· �,•ns,• of it 11111st reflect that fact, and res�t the nature of law as it lS,
2�. �)11,• ,·:m ask !Jllt'stions of it of the following kinds: What terms of factual.
descrrph,m_;111,l llf \'aliu: does it employ, and how do they Rt together? What
voices or rnl,•� tlol'S it define, and what character do these definitions give the
communit�· an,\ its mt•mbers? 'What are its procedures for determining dif
fe�enc�-s. :uul ,·,H\Sid,•riug changes? What, in short, would it be like to speak
this way. to li"e the life this language makes possible?
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Where the language a.nd practice are those of the criminal law, the
meaning is of a special kind, the meaning of punishment.
B.ut what kind of meaning is this? That is our next question.

B.

The Meaning of Punishment as Blaming

The old common law formulation, that there can be no criminal
guilt without a "mens rea," or guilty mind, certainly reflects a concep
tion of the criminal law as a species of blaming. The Model Penal
Code, which codifies enlightened modem opinion, states as its central
principle the allocation of criminal responsibility according to blame
worthiness. 21 In fact, punishment, within the criminal law as well
as outside of it, has traditionally been regarded as a special form of
the social and intellectual practice we call "blaming." If we can
make sense of that; practice-as I think we can-we may be able to
regard the central activity of the criminal law as likewise intelligible,
and indeed discover a ground, very diHerent from a statement of pur
poses, upon which that activity may be shaped and guided.
The idea that the criminal law is a species of blaming is an un
comfortable one. Blaming seems to entail retribution, and we like
to think that we have outgrown that as an element of punishment.22
Moreover, it seems difficult or impossible to restate the practice of
blaming-which is in some sense perfectly familiar �nd intelligible
-in a language of social policy and objective. And blaming itself,
even in 01;dinary life, is problematic: we all engage in it but feel
uneasy about what we do-more uneasy than I think we should.
I think that the heart of the difficulty for most people, both in
ordinary life and in the law, is that there is an apparent conflict be
tween blaming on the one hand and sympathizing and understanding
on the other. It is sometimes said, indeed, that when enough is
sympathetically understood about . a person, blaming becomes im
possible, even in the case of the person who commits atrocities or
is utterly selfish. Tout comprendre, dest tout pardonner. And in.
21. Under the Code blamewotthiness is to be measured in what is meant
to be a much more refined manner than that permitted by the common law, for
instead of asking whether the defendant had a guilty mind or �enter or malice,
under this code the trier of fact will be asked to decide whether the defendant
was purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent; and this question is asked not in
a general or diffuse way, but with respect to each element of the offense.
22. Compare the awkwardness with which the modem orthodoxy treats the
alleged retributive purpose of the criminal law. It disallows retribution as an
affinnative basis fo� action against the defendant-it seems irrational, emotional,
beneath our dignity-but uses the concept of "just deserts" in a protective way,
denying the state the power to punish a person more than his conduct deserves,
even if his restraint or rehabilitation might be thought to require more. This
use of fairness as a limit upon the use which may properly be made of a person
for utilitarian reasons is difficult to justify on utilitarian grounds, except in a most
attenuated or circular way.
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some logically extreme sense that is true: if one were to step wholly
into the shoes of another-to see what he sees, to feel what he feels
-one would not blame him for what he did, at least not any more
than he blamed himself. Our own experience seems to prove the
conflict, for as we learn more about a person we are blaming, we
notice that the impulse to blame weakens, and often disappears
perhaps to our momentary chagrin. Blaming, 'in short, seems incom
patible with one of our ,deepest wishes, to regard ourselves as sym
pathetic and understanding.
But to rid ourselves of blaming seems simply impossible. As a
matter of ordinary experience, blaming is something we do in fact
and will continue to do. It is part of our c onstitution. Suppose, for
example, that you found your tires slashed when you went out to
your car this evening, or the pages you wanted cut from a library
book. What would you do? The refusal to blame is equally impos
sible, I believe, at the level of community action. We blame collec
tively as we do individually, not by choice or will, but by nature.
One might be tempted to take the view that the impulse to blame,
howev�r ingrained in us, is an unfortunate carryover from an earlier
stage of evolution, a mere instinct which it is the work of time and
conscience, indeed of civilization. to overcome. At least in our official
world, one might say, we ought to be able to act rationally, free from
such impulses. This view is, I think, unrealistic-I have not noticed
that our official life is free from instinct and impulse-and it mis
conceives the nature of blaming, of rationality, and of civjlization.
For blaming seems in fact to be essential to whatever dignity, and
decency the criminal law has. Indeed, I think that one carinot even
imagine a tolerable system of criminal law that did not operate by
blaming.
To test this point, ask yourself how you might try to remove the
practice of blaming from the criminal law. One possibility-present
in our own •system to a.t least some degree-would be to hold people
criminally responsible for their conduct, and the consequences thereof,
without regard to fault. But this would seem to us both unfair and,
in its extreme form, willfully senseless, a kind of crazy obliteration of
distinctions that are essential resources for our collective life. The
diJie�ence between accidental and deliberate injury is important to
any jud gment about conduct. (As Justice Holmes said, even a dog
knows the difference between being stumbled over and b�ing kicked.)
Such a system would exclude from consideration just those elements
of motive and: feeling that contribute most to the meaning of events,
from whatever point of view. 23 This w_ould be blaming ,vithout
blameworthiness, both unfair and foolish.
23. It woul<l also write out of the criminal law the important branch )mown
as attempt, and make it e.<ttremely difficult to rationalize both conspiracy and
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The other non-blaming alternative would be to dispense with
both the act and state of mind requirements of the criminal law
indeed with all aspects of what we now call the trial stage of the
process-and instead have a compulsory treatment system operated
on the model of our present involuntary commitment practices. The
basis for detention would be a judgment not about the blameworthi
ness of one's conduct but about the propensities of one's personality.
No one would ever be blamed or punished for what he did; but
we would all be subject to compulsory detention when the interests
of the public were judged to require it. This is unthinkable. It would
expose every citizen to the incompetence, caprice, and corruption of
coercive official action; in the terms suggested earlier, it would define
every citizen not as a free person with defined liberties, but as simply
belonging to the bureaucratic state for its use. It would also abolish
distinctions that are natural and important to us, for e:cample, the
distinction between responsible and irresponsible conduct, and that
between dangerous people who never act on their propensities and
those who do. It would be an abdication bv the communitv, or bv
its official part, of its function as .the maker of a language of ;pprov�l
and disapproval, of praise and blame. The practice of punishment
is by nature a practice of blaming conduct, and we cannot live with
out it.
What I have said so far is that while blaming seems incompatible
with understanding and sympathy, it is also built-fortunately or
unfortunately-into our nature; what is more, it seems essential to
any acceptable system of criminal law. Can more perhaps be said
in favor of it than that?
I would like to reconsider the point that blaming is inconsistent
with understanding and sympathy, for I think I have put that incom
pletely. It is true that the more fully one steps into the shoes of
another, adopting his experience, his feelings, his view of the world,
the less one is inclined to blame him ( or to blame him more than he
himself does). From his point of view, then, blaming is indeed in
consistent with sympathy and understanding. But the more one steps
into his shoes, the less one can inhabit those of the victim, the less
one can sympathize with and understand him; and the less, likewise,
one remains aware of one's own position, whatever that may be.
Blaming is a way of limiting one's imaginative or sympathetic identifi
cation with the actor, but this is done in the interest of maintaining
one's capacities to remember what one knows and feels about others
as well. It is a way of saying to the offender and to his victim
that in the eyes of the community both have claims to recognition
accessorial liability. Further, under this system, the act requirement of the
criminal law would lose its force as a meaningful protection to the socially
competent, for anyone can have an accident.
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and sympathy. For one's identification with the victim is also quali
fied by the practice of blaming. The victim is not entitled, that is,
to demand public condemnation on a showing of his injuries alone;
he must speak a language of fault and blame. Similarly, the defend
ant will not be excused on the grounds that perfect sympathy would
lead to forgiveness, if it would, for he is not entitled to that. He
and the victim are alike entitled to a sympathy that runs at least two
ways, that recognizes both parties. The defendant ,vill indeed be
held to standards of conduct; but only those that he can meet. The
community insists to each of the characters that it will recognize the
existence of the other, and it forces each to speak a language which
does this too; 24 in doing this, the community claims and performs a
meaning for its action or inaction; it defines and maintains a character
of its own. This last, indeed, is the critical achievement of the prac
tice of blaming, for there is no guarantee, indeed little likelihood,
that the communal insistence I describe will much affect the subjec
tive view either of a particular defendant or of his victim. The one
wants to get off, the other wants revenge. It is in its own interest
that the community acts when it insists upon recognizjng the claims
of both, for this insistence gives the community an important part of
its character, an achievement not dependent upon the understanding
or acquiescence of others.23
The community so created is not an abstraction, an institution,
or a bureaucracy, but is a living wo�ld defined by the actions of in
dividual people responsible for particular judgments. For the judg
ment of blame is made by one jury or one judge about one man; the
sentence a person must suffer is passed upon him by another who is
responsible for the judgment. The law happens, as it should be
studied, one case at a time. It is one of the merits of the law, especially
of the criminal law, that the judge not only may but must tum from
the impossible institutional ideal of deciding every case perfectly
in accordance with some set of rules, to deciding, within limits, each
case on his view of its merits.28 The defendant addresses the person
who is responsible for his case, the proper disposition of which re
quires an individualized judgment about him. This is an important
24. On the coercive nature of legal discourse, see White, T1"' Fourth Amend
ment a, a Way of Talking About People, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 165, 167 n.3 ( 1974).
25. The definition and elaboration of a character is essential to the making
of those shared meanings that constitute a culture. Lack of attention to quef•
tions of character, in the modern fashion, does not lead to characterlessness (for
that is impossible), but to the character of a culture thai: concerns itself with
results not relations, with quantities not meanings.
26. Compare the voice of the judge who says that "I have decided to sentence
you to two years in jail," with that of the professor or politician or bureaucrat
who says "'the question is whether we really want to have a policy which • • ...
Who on earth is that "we"?
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way in which the criminal law defines the citizen and his relation to
the community.27
Even when he is sent to a special place of punishment, the, de
fendant remains a member of his community, entitled to all protec
tions l.\nd recognitions not t aken away as punishment. The idea is
not the theory of the modern orthodoxy, that he has forfeited .to a
bureaucracy his sovereignty over himself by his wrong, for he lias
not, but that he has exposed himself to a sanction whose very premise
assumes his continued responsibility for himself. � 8 This is in practical
terms a wise assumption because nearly all of the people we punish
eventually come back from prison or jail to join the larger society.
To say, as I do, that the criminal law can be made sense of if
and only if-it is regarded ns a system of blaming is not. of course,
to answer every question about it. Decisions still must be made
regarding what conduct should be blamed and how much; about
admissibility of evidence, instructions to the jury. and the like; and
about questions of guilt and disposition. What the conception of the
process as "blaming" affords is a method of organizing the activity, a
premise upon which intelligible q\lestions c-an be asked and responded
to at each stage. In making these judgments people will still address
tensions that can be seen as conflicts between the individual and
society and may even use language that bears some resemblance to
the terms in which the "'purposes" are stated. A judgment about
blaming, for example, often includes a statement of fear, or of a need
to repress or restrain. My suggestion is not that the participants in
the process, conceived of this , way, will h:we nothing to do, or that
their decisions will be easy; but that, however difficult any particular
27.• Compare F. Allen, Criminal Law and the llodern Consciowne.m Some
Obaervatio11a on Blameworlhi11eas, 44 TENN. L. REv. i35 ( 1977).
28, In holding people responsible for their conduct, the practice of blaming
affirms, ns a general matter, tl1e power of a person to choose what he does. Of
course the question of freedom of will is prob!l-matic: sometimes, or in some
respects, we perceive ourselves and others to be truly free agents; in others, we
are so confined by past and present circumstances that the word "free" can not
intelligibly or fairly be used. And the sense of freedom that we do have may
he illusory or exaggerated, But any ethical system. which Is by definition about
choice, must posit the power to choose. And a criminal law that is "ethical" In
this sense is surely far more respectful of the offender than one that, denying
his freedom to choose, simply treats his conduct as a product of circumstance.
In this sense both the modem criminal law and the practice of blaming are
ethical systems. But the practice of blaming seems to recognize more fully
than the modem orthodoxy th11 uncertainties and doubts that surround our sense
of f��dom; it admits more openly that the "voluntarv" act may be "involun
tary, that the defendant would, if all were known, he forgiven bv a remote
and omnipotent judge. For It does not proclaim a forfeiture. what it does
in.,ist upon is only tliat the imperatl\•e., of social life be recognized, an insistence
compatible with the recognition of the defendant"� humanity but not with a
collective use of him. Tliis is no more than parents lovingly insist upon.
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judgment, they will be able to say to themselves and others that they
know what they are up to and how to go about it.
My conclusion, then, is that one can indeed make sense of the
criminal law if one conceives of it not as a bureaucratic system
designed to achieve certain stated goals but as a system of meaning
�t operates by blaming. On this view the criminal law makes sense
and more: the social and intellectual relations nffirmed and ena�ed by
blaming are important and healthy parts of the process by which
self and community are defined in our world.
You may properly ask what Bows in practical terms from such
a view. I think quite a lot does.
1. Criminal punishment ought to he based upon blameworthiness
onl], and not imposed upon those who cannot he blamed. The
determination of what is blameable is the tusk in the first i1111tance for
the legislature; ultimately, within the bounduri� so e.stabluihcd and
subject to constitutional limitations, for the judgl' and jury.
2. The criminal law· should use a language of blame, so far as
possible a language continuous with that of or<lin.uy English.:111 Only
29. The language in which offenses are defined c-.i.n and should reflec.-t a
conception ,,f the criminal process as based upon the practlt.-e of blaming. This
can Lie done through the use of terms exr,rcssly invitit11:"' judgments of moral
fault, such us "mens rea" nr dguilty mind• or "scientt-r or "wicked," as the
common law originally did; or it can be done in the apparently more refined
and ohjecti,·c way recommended by the �lndcl Penal Code, with its careful
definitions of purpose, knowledge. recklessness, and neglig,mc.-e. ( The .-efincment
may he unly apparent: the definitions ultimately im·itc or rec111irc plain judgments
of culpability, cr.g., whether a risk is "'unju.�tifiable," and the distinctions among
them sometimL-s seem to dissuh·e in particular c-.i.ses.) In his important hoolc.
,\x IxQvmY 1:-."To C,u�UNAL Gl."ILT ( 196.'3), with which this paper has much in
common, Professor Pete Brett argued for the use of the ol<lcr terminology.
The defen.�es should likewise reHect this cont.-eption of the criminal law, as
to some extent indeed they already do. It may be thought that the set of excuses
and jnstifi.cations evolved at common law-especially self-defense, duress, in
sanity, infancy, and neces.,ity-<:onstitute an adequately exhaustive catalogue of
the sorts of circumstnnc,es in which an actor, otherwise guilty of an offense, should
be excused. Or one might prefer a. catch-all defense, as Professor Brett does.
He would have the court in borderline cases "tell the jury that the\' must
endeavor to put themselves in the defendant's place, and ask whether tliey can
truly say, 'I understand why he did this, but lie ought not to have done it; if
I had been in his plo.ce, I would not-or t hope I would not-have done it
mvself.' If they cannot say this, they should absolve him from guilt.'' Id. at 77.
T.nis seems to me a satisfactory. indeed a wise, proposal, ussuming that the
instruction would be given only in cases in which the court was in doubt. (The
jury's judgment of blame, like its other judgments, should in my view be sub
jected to reasoned and respectful judicial corftrol.) It is important to stress that
the question on which the court Is to debmnine its degree of doubt is not a
factual nor a legal question, but a moral one: whether ttie defendant should be
blamed for what he did. ( Compare Professor Fletcher's interesting article, The
lndwlduali.r.atlon of E:r:curing Co11dltio113, 47 So. C..U.. L. REV, 1269 ( 1974).)
Finally, the sentencing process should reflect the blaming character of the
enterprL<e, as In some respects it already does. As for the poliw :md prosel'II•
torial judg111ents, at present so enormously discrctionl\ry ,md and nnrationalized,
they alreaay rest in large part upon common-sense judgments of blameworthiness.
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then will it make sense to the defendant, the victim, and the public;
only then can the jury and the judge understand what they are up to
and how to go about it
3. The jury should be retained, for the properly instructed com
munity of laymen is in fact peculiarly competent at 'the practice of
blaming that lies at the center of the criminal process. It is more
competent at this practice than any one man could be, for collective
judgment reduces idiosyncrasy; and it is more expert than any pro
fessional, for whom each case tends to be just one of many, the
material upon which his profession or the bureaucratic institution of
the criminal law acts.
4. The insanity defense should be retained. Its object is to per
mit the jury to separate out for different treatment those people whom
they believe cannot fairly be blamed for what they did. Its formula
tion should express this function.
5. We should stop talking of deterrence as a "goal" of punishment
that should in any way affect igdividual judgments of guilt, grading,
or disposition. Of course it is true that deterrence will continue to be
one of the effects of the practice of punishment, and we can be pleased
that that is so.30 But the criminal law proper concerns itself only with
instances of violation, and these should be punished only as blame
requires, never for exemplary or deterrent reasons- 31

30. It is natural and wholly proper that the dominant motive of the legisla
ture in passing a criminal statute is to influence conduct through the threat of
punishment. :\{y concern here has not been with that point, but with the kind
of criminal law the legislature ought to make: it should consist of clear prohibi
tions, defining the conduct that will be judged ( as a prima facie Ulatter) to be
blameworthy; and it should contain institutional arrangements designed to ensure
that no one is punished who, it is decided, cannot be blamed for his conduct when
all matters of circumstance are considered. The system may be deterrent in gen•
eral aim, that is, but it should operate by blaming. <;:ompare Rawls, Two Con
cepts of Rules-, in T1u: 'PHILOSOPHY OF PuxrsmrEST 105 ( H. Acton ed. 1969).
For it to operate otherwise would be, as I ltave asserted here, an improper
definition of the relationship between the individual and his government.
31. The rationale for deterrent punishment sometimes takes _this form: "We
agree that the circumstances of the particular offender and his offense call for
li:,nitv. hut we are afraid that if we treat him that wav the force of our threat
to ,;thers,. upon which compliance with our rnle depend5, will be reduced."
\Vhat this fear rests upon is the view that if one attempts to explain why this
defendant was being treated leniently, others, failing to understand our distinc
ti�ns,_ would more readily engage in �mch more hlameworthv conduct. I think
thlS 1s wrong, e,·en m the clearest kmcl of case for exemplary punishment, say
that of a person involved ( hut in a manner we regard as on l:,· marginally blame
worthy) in an uirplnne hijacking. For trust in our capacitv to make clear the
distinctions upon which judgrnents of blaine rest and to enforce them in future
cases is an essential part of the character of the law in our culture. To draw
the distinctions as we honestly perceive them and to rest confidently upon them
are necessary to the making of a genuine language of fact and value.
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CONCLUSION

The subject of this paper has been the choice between two ways
of describing and analyzing the criminal law. On the one side is
what I call systems-design talk, theoretical in quality, mechanical in
image and operation. This way of talking about the criminal law
seems to me to make no sense of it: in these terms it is split by con
tradiction and fails to fit with the otqer things we do and the other
conceptions \\'.'e have of ourselves. It is in�oherent internally and
externally. The other way of talking about the criminal law assumes
that the law is a set of social practices the fm1ction of which is the mak
ing of meaning, a language that defines a community and its members.
On this view the criminal law is seen as a form of the special practice
we call blaming. Blaming is an activity whic:h. lih• other important
cultural activities, cannot be reproduced in the languagt• of systems
desi gn, but it is intelligible to all of us. �o tolt-rable system of crimi
nal law can be imagined without it. It is not. as it may at first seem.
inconsistent with the ideal of sympathy and undl'rstandin!,!:. hut is a
way in which the community extends its snnpathy two ways ut once.
insisting upon the equal worth ,md humanitY of l'ach ml'mlwr against
those who arrogate to themselves what thl'y should not. It imposes
no forfeiture .md makes 110 use of thl' dl•frnd:.mt. hut pnnislws him
as a parent punishes a child. to teach him what that act makes true.
that we all live here together.
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